Those of us of a certain age can remember when hearing the words, “the bomb,” we automatically knew it was the atomic bomb.  For most of my life, I lived under the threat of nuclear warfare, a conflict that, if started, would devastate most of Western Europe and much of the United States.  That threat was real, as the Soviet Union, a communist nation, obtained their own version of atomic weapons in 1949.  The Cold War was on.

Nuclear warfare began on August 6, 1945, 72 years ago, when the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan.  Without any response from the Japanese warlords, then President Harry Truman ordered the second one dropped on Nagasaki, Japan.  Estimates vary as to the death toll in these two attacks, but most put the total at between 160,000 to 200,000, with more succumbing to radiation in the days, weeks and months following.

The history of splitting the atom is well-known.  From the first controlled reaction in the basement under Stagg Field at the University of Chicago, to the work at Oak Ridge in Tennessee, to the desert facility at Los Alamos in New Mexico, the Manhattan Project produced the first bombs with unheard of destructive power.  In July 1945, a test was conducted at Los Alamos, which achieved more than what was expected.  We now had the ultimate weapon to end the war in the Pacific.

Since the use of the weapons, controversy has swirled around the decision by President Truman to use them.  He always claimed that he did not waste a minute regretting his decision to rain that destruction down on the nation that had attacked us at Pearl Harbor, an attack made while there were negotiations ongoing in Washington, D. C. to lessen the tensions between the two nations.

How has that attack stood up to the ravages of time? Many today look back at the end of the war and declare atomic power was unnecessary to bring the conflict to an end.  Japan had been isolated in the Pacific as Allied forces (mostly U. S. forces) had gradually conquered the island fortresses guarding the approaches to Japan’s home island.  By August 1945 we had been constantly bombing Japan, many times using incendiary devices that caused destructive fires in the larger cities.  In April of 1945, fire storms were created in Tokyo and other large metropolitan areas which destroyed thousands of buildings and took many lives.  All that was left was one great push, one attack by thousands of troops and the Rising Sun would set forever.

Because of the unknown effects on people and land, some even at that time expressed reservations about the use of atomic power.  Some who had worked on the Manhattan Project were among those who questioned this action, and even General Eisenhower had doubts of its effectiveness in ending the war.  Since then, the acknowledged devastation and long-range problems caused by radiation have caused some to label the use of the bombs wrong and a crime against humanity.

But after an objective study of the military situation in the summer of 1945, those who claim the United States was wrong to use the bomb are seen to be revisionist historians.  These who so believe are using the information about nuclear power gained during the succeeding years and applying today’s standards to the military and civilian leadership of over 70 years ago.

First, what were the options open to us to end the war using conventional warfare?  Bombing factories constructing war materiel and the cities surrounding those facilities was one strategy we were attempting.  In the European part of World War 2, such bombing was aimed at crippling the German war making machine.  Also, it was assumed that such tactics as carpet bombing civilian areas would demoralize the German population and help bring the conflict to an early end.  This did not happen; it is now generally conceded that even the most destructive of bombing raids only strengthened the will of the German people to continue to fight with renewed vigor.   Only the introduction of ground troops on the European continent from D-Day on and the gradual, and often costly, conquering of territory was the deciding factor.  Eventually Allied forces had to cross the Rhine and push deep into Germany before the Nazis gave up and sued for peace.  Why would bombing factories and civilians accomplish in Japan what it did not in Germany?

Another proposal was to simply isolate the island nation and starve them out. Create an effective blockade and eventually even the military would give up.  This was feasible, one supposes, if we were willing to ring the Japanese homeland with a huge flotilla of warships, manned by hundreds of thousands of sailors and soldiers.  Of course, how long this would take was not explained by those who urged this course of action.  The Germans had been surrounded by Allies on all sides, and the homeland was hurting for food land basic supplies by the Spring of 1945.  Yet it was only the use of our overwhelming superiority in land forces and control of the air war that forced the German generals to give up the fight.

Of course, the other alternative was to use invasion to compel the forces of the enemy in the Far East to admit defeat and leave the lists.  And plans were made to do just that.  An invasion was contemplated for 1946, and how long that would take was, again, anyone’s guess.  Battle hardened soldiers from the European part of World War 2 were readied for combat in Asia, and newly minted servicemen were also on their way to do battle with the Japanese.

But that course of action would entail a huge cost in casualties.  Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, cited the 766,000 casualties the Allied forces took from D-Day to VE Day (6 June 1944 to 7 May 1945, eleven months) as a baseline for Operation Downfall, the code name for the invasion of Japan.  He believed that opposition would be even more intense there than in the last days of the European part of the War.  Other estimates included one done for Stimson’s staff.  This claimed possibly 1.7 million to 4 million American casualties to conquer Japan, including at least 400,000 battle deaths.  Herbert Hoover sent memoranda to President Truman and Secretary of War Stimson claiming 500,000 to 1,000,000 deaths.  Other estimates varied as low as about 250,000 deaths with many more injuries.

American intelligence had already concluded that most Japanese civilians could be expected to participate in the country’s defense, and this would then make the civilian casualty figures much higher than the invaders’ losses.  Rugged terrain in all of the home islands figured in the estimates.

One battle was considered a “dress rehearsal” for the invasion of Japan, and that was the battle for Okinawa, in March and April of 1945.  In a much smaller area, half of the 300,000 civilians were killed or missing after the battle.  In addition, if the battle casualty rate in the invasion of Japan proper was only 5% of the unit rate in Okinawa, this would mean about 300,000 Americans would die in Operation Downfall.

Army replacement plans for dead and wounded estimated almost 800,000 would be needed if the invasion lasted until the end of 1946.

Given even the lowest “educated guess” of the casualty rate, it seemed as if the invasion by ground troops would claim as many or more American lives as did the three years and eight months of the war to that date.  With the information available to him at the time, President Truman made the world-changing decision to use atomic power to end the war.  Since no word came from the warlords, the second bomb was used, and within a week the war was over.

Still today many Japanese feel they were the unfair target of our unjustified use of the bomb.  There has been no official apology for beginning the conflict with the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.  Japanese children are not taught about how the war began, or about the Japanese responsibility for it.  Nor do their schoolbooks contain such information about the atrocities committed by the Japanese troops.  China’s sufferings at the hands of Japanese soldiers is exemplified by the Rape of Nanking.  Nor is the Bataan Death March included in such instruction, or the medical experiments on captured Allied personal mentioned, nor the abuse missionaries suffered, or the treatment handed out to prisoners of war, where death to those unfortunates included beheading with swords used by Japanese soldiers.  Regularly, high officials honor the Japanese war criminals who were executed by visiting a memorial to them.  Even former President Barack Obama came close to apologizing for the use of the ultimate weapon when he was on a visit to Japan during his presidency.  Germany, at least, has comes to terms with its Nazi past, including the Holocaust.

Perhaps forgotten in the arguments for and against the bombs dropped on Japan on August 6 and August 9 1945 is the testimony of those who were directly affected by it.  I recall two G. I.s whose lives were possibly saved by the atomic blasts.  Their descendants are alive only because of Truman’s decision.

One of these men was a nineteen year old draftee on a troop ship headed to the Pacific war theatre.  He, Ray Gipson, always credited that bomb for his future life as a minister who specialized in work with children.  Another is a good friend of mine, Alva Good.  Alva received his draft notice on his 21st birthday, and selected the airborne for training.  Eventually getting to Europe in mid 1944, he saw his first action as a paratrooper on foot during the Battle of the Bulge.  Also, he was a part of the first jump into Germany in March 1945, and survived being shot at on the way down.  He was on his way home in July after VE Day in early May when the bomb dropped.  As a battle experienced paratrooper, he was a valuable asset for the invasion of Japan.  But it was not to be, and he has expressed his appreciation for the quick end to the war.  Those stories are multiplied many times over.

It is so easy to criticize another’s actions after the fact, sometimes many years after the fact.  The incredible destruction of nuclear weapons is now known well, and the fear of nuclear holocaust makes many people anti-nuclear in any form.  Yet knowing the circumstances surrounding the decision to use atomic bombs compels us to agree with President Truman and those who lives were spared when they were used.  As terrible a weapon that is, the saving of lives and the cost to the nation would still dictate its use.